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The Conservative Party was the last of the major political parties in Britain to involve 
its ordinary “grass roots” members in the election of their leaders. The Labour Party 
gave its constituency members 30% of the votes in an electoral college for the first 
time in 1983, while the Liberal Democrats’ members have always elected their leaders 
since the formation of the party in 1988 following precedent from the Liberal Party. 
However, the Conservatives were for a long time somewhat reluctant to trust their 
members with the task. 
Until 1998, the Conservative leader was elected by its MPs, using variations on a 
system dating back to 1965 involving a series of ballots taking place until a candidate 
achieved a set proportion of the votes. There were a number of advantages of this 
system. In particular, the MPs were seen as experts, on both the requirements of the 
leadership position, and the personal qualities of the candidates. It was also quick and 
(if no-one blabbed to the press) discreet – most contests only took a few days. 
However, after the 1997 General Election when the Conservatives suffered huge 
losses, the old system looked inadequate when John Major immediately resigned to 
trigger a contest. There were no Conservative MPs in either Scotland or Wales, so 
whole areas of the country were unrepresented in the process. Furthermore, many 
experienced Conservatives had either retired or lost their seats, which rather 
undermined the argument about MPs’ superior expertise. 
The grass roots members were becoming increasingly disenchanted with their 
exclusion from the process of electing the leader. They were supposedly consulted by 
the 1922 Committee of backbench Conservative MPs’, but the MPs had consistently 
ignored their views. The members were particularly outraged by the deposing of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1990, and their advice (to elect the well-known and popular 
Kenneth Clarke) was rejected again in 1997. Given that it was the behaviour of MPs 
squabbling over the terms of Britain’s membership of the European Union that had 
undermined Major’s government and helped cause the General Election defeat, this 
was very galling for the extra-Parliamentary party. 
After some years of neglect, the party organisation was in a ramshackle state as well, 
and in his leadership campaign in 1997, William Hague promised a new leadership 
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to help recruitment. As it was, Hague defeated Clarke in the final leadership contest 
among the MPs in 1997, and in 1998 implemented his proposals for a new system. 
This system, which is still in place, has three stages. The first is a challenge to the 
current leader, which can be triggered if 15% of Conservative MPs write to the 
Chairman of the 1922 Committee and demand a contest. If this happens, then there is 
a no-confidence vote which takes place among MPs only; if the leader gets over 50% 
of the votes, he or she can continue and the process ends, but if the score is 50% or 
under, he or she is deposed, and we move to the second stage. Now, new candidates 
(the rejected leader cannot stand) declare themselves, and the MPs hold a series of 
ballots on a Strictly Come Dancing-style system where whoever comes bottom is 
eliminated. This stage carries on until there are two candidates left. At this point, we 
move to stage three, which is a postal ballot over a series of weeks of the extra-
Parliamentary party as to who they prefer between the final two. 
Many people were worried by this system when it was unveiled, as it splits the basis 
of power within the party. The grass roots members do the hiring, but the MPs do the 
firing. The MPs actually retain a lot of the power that they used to have; they control 
whether a leader carries on, and if not, they decide which choice of MPs will be put to 
the party members. 
This new system has been used three times, with decidedly mixed results. In 2001, 
there was no need for the no-confidence vote, as the contest was triggered by Hague’s 
resignation. Prominent MP Ann Widdecombe joined the contest early on, but 
withdrew, complaining that though she had much support in the party as a whole she 
was unpopular at Westminster. She maintained that grass roots members wanted to 
vote for her, but that the MPs would make sure she was eliminated long before the 
final ballot. 
In the end, five candidates stood. The first ballot of MPs was a disaster: two 
candidates, Michael Ancram and David Davis, shared last place, and the rules made 
no provision as to what to do in such circumstances! (The Liberal Party had had a 
similar experience in its leadership election of 1967, but in that case the two 
candidates withdrew from the contest.) So a second ballot had to take place with 
exactly the same set of candidates; Ancram was eliminated, after which Davis 
withdrew. The third ballot was finely balanced. Kenneth Clarke, who was thought too 
pro-Europe to lead the party, won the ballot with 59 votes. Iain Duncan Smith, a 
prominent rebel against Major’s government, was second with 54 votes. Third, and 
therefore eliminated, was the early favourite Michael Portillo with 53. The campaign 
had been extremely ill-tempered, dominated by allegations about homosexual 
encounters in Portillo’s past. Accusations flew that Clarke had only done so well 
because of tactical “stop Portillo” votes. 
The deciding ballot of members between Clarke and Duncan Smith continued the bad 
feeling. Because it was a postal ballot that took place over several weeks, the 
candidates found themselves campaigning to people who had already voted. And the 
lack of up-to-date membership lists made contacting the members even harder. The 
process was very time consuming, and expensive (each candidate was allowed to, and 
did, spend £100,000). Attitude toward the EU seemed the deciding factor; Duncan 
Smith was sound on (i.e. opposed to) Europe, and beat the vastly more experienced 
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Duncan Smith, however, proved to be an unlucky (and, many argued, inept) leader, 
and the Conservatives failed to emerge from the electoral doldrums. Indeed, there was 
much talk that the resurgent Liberal Democrats under their popular leader Charles 
Kennedy would supplant the Conservatives as the main opposition to Tony Blair’s 
Labour Party. After a poor by-election performance in Brent East in 2003 followed by 
a shambolic party conference (in which Duncan Smith made his much-derided remark 
“The quiet man [i.e. himself] is turning up the volume”), the Parliamentary party 
turned on him. Enough letters were received by the Chairman of the 1922 Committee 
to trigger a no-confidence motion, which Duncan Smith lost 90-75. 
The extra-Parliamentary party got the blame for making a poor choice of leader in 
2001, and Conservative MPs were keen to avoid a second bad-tempered drawn-out 
contest in two years as they languished in the polls. Furthermore, there was a great 
deal of speculation about the likely candidacy of David Davis, seen to be on the right 
of the party, who was popular and respected in some quarters (and widely expected to 
win any ballot of the grass roots), but very unpopular with some MPs. 
Three reasons emerged to avoid a contest involving the grass roots. Some MPs 
wanted to settle the leadership question quickly. Some blamed the grass roots for a 
bad choice in 2001. Some thought the grass roots would elect Davis, and did not wish 
for that to happen. The only way to avoid a contest would be for MPs to coalesce 
around a single candidate, which they did: the experienced former Home Secretary 
Michael Howard, who had quit front-line politics in 1999 but returned to join Duncan 
Smith’s front bench in 2001. Davis decided not to stand, and a contest was avoided. 
This was entirely within the rules, but the deliberate effect was to deny the grass roots 
a say. 
Howard led the Conservatives to a third consecutive General Election defeat in 2005, 
and immediately announced his intention to retire after he had changed the electoral 
system. He clearly shared the view that the grass roots were too unreliable and out of 
touch to elect a sensible leader, and tasked Francis Maude to come up with an 
alternative system which reduced their influence. But Maude’s system failed by a 
fraction to get the 60% support of the extra-Parliamentary party that was needed for a 
rule change. MPs were frustrated, but the 2005 contest would have to take place under 
the same set of rules. 
To the surprise of many, the contest – which sprawled over seven months thanks to 
the attempt to change the rules – was relatively friendly. The key moment was during 
the party conference, when the long time front runner Davis made a speech judged as 
lacklustre, while David Cameron – at the time in third place in polls of MPs behind 
Davis and Clarke – made a fluent well-received speech without notes. By the end of 
the conference week, Cameron had become the favourite and remained comfortably in 
front. 
The final ballot, of party members, was between Cameron and Davis; together they 
took part in eleven party hustings around the country, closed to the media, and a 
special edition of Question Time. The campaign changed very little, although it did 
allow Cameron and Davis, who did not know each other very well, to develop a 
friendly working relationship. Cameron won the ballot by a 2-1 majority. 
There is still a question mark over the leadership rules even though the contest in 
2005 was a success: why was 2001 a problem? Will the MPs feel obliged in future to 
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One answer is to deny that the system actually changed much. Yes, the grass roots 
chose Duncan Smith, but if the system was at fault, we must argue that the MPs 
would have chosen someone else in 2001. This is highly debatable. The MPs rejected 
the compromise/unity candidate (Michael Ancram), the modernising candidate (David 
Davis) and the eurosceptic front-runner (Michael Portillo). It is hard to imagine pro-
European Kenneth Clarke winning the leadership during those fraught times. Iain 
Duncan Smith is the only candidate left. 
Nevertheless, there are clearly dangers in any system that allows one group of people 
to choose a leader and another to get rid of him or her. In 2001, 112 out of 166 
Conservative MPs (67.5%) had not voted for Duncan Smith in the final ballot of MPs, 
and felt no consequent loyalty to him when he came under pressure. That situation, 
where the MPs split almost equally three ways, was peculiarly bad from that point of 
view, but such a division may well happen in the future, and it is very dangerous for 
any leader who does not receive the explicit support of a large number of MPs. MPs 
may well feel less commitment to someone they did not vote for (in fact, although 90 
MPs voted for David Cameron in 2005, 108 voted against him – should he be 
worried?). By ensuring that the last ballot of MPs is a three-cornered contest, the 
system generates such risks. 
It also seems to be the case that perceptions of the difficulties of the new rules have 
been significant. This was the reason why Davis was forced out of the contest in 2003, 
and the reason why Howard tried to change the rules in 2005 (if he had not tried to 
change the rules, the leadership would have been settled before the party conference 
which turned the tide in Cameron’s favour). 
Interestingly, those negative perceptions seem to have resulted in the modernisation 
effort in the Conservative Party being associated with the reduction of democracy – 
rather as happened with the reform of the Labour Party in the early 1990s. Normally, 
democracy and modernity are seen as going hand-in-hand, but when party leaders do 
not trust their members they diverge. The success of the 2005 contest for the 
Conservative leadership has reduced the pressure for change, but will the system 
survive another problematic election? 
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